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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Abstract 
Under international criminal law (ICL), there are factual and legal intricacies. Of these 
intricacies, the issues concerning the modes of responsibility, which are enshrined under Article 
25(3) of the ICC Statute, have been the preponderant focus. Specifically, besides the incongruity 
on the approaches of distinguishing among each other, there is no unanimity on the question of 
degrees of blameworthiness. Put differently, under ICL, there is uncertainty on how to draw a 
line among the modes of responsibility and the raison d'etre behind their enumeration. These 
ambivalences have caused various arguments both in and outside the ICC. 
Hence, this thesis scrutinises these disputatious issues of modes of responsibility under the ICC 
Statute and strives to come up with an ameliorating solution. To this end, besides the ICC 
Statute, the study is backed up by a comparative study of selected common and civil law 
countries.  
1.2 General Overview  
Whenever there is a criminal conduct, the state uses its criminal law as a means and stabilises the 
situation. However, the effect of all crimes is not limited within the geographical boundary of 
one state. There are crimes that affect the entire international community.
1
 Moreover, owing to 
reasons such as the nature of the commission of international crimes, offenders of such crimes 
have greater chance of left unpunished. Accordingly, ICL developed with the aim of curbing 
                                                 
1
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) Preamble 3 and 9.    
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such impunity. Unlike the domestic jurisdiction, the „clienteles‟ of ICL are those persons who 
alleged to have committed heinous crimes and bear the greatest responsibility.
2
 Irrespective of 
this aim, ICL developed in the twentieth century. Before this time, its birth was hampered by two 
factors.
3
 First, the scope of classical international law was limited to State-to-State relationship. 
Thus, the issue of individual offenders were within the exclusive jurisdiction of domestic legal 
systems.
4
 Secondly, it was related with the principle of the Westphalian Sovereignty System. 
This system argues for the legal equality of states, and the abstention of one state in the domestic 
affairs of another state.
5
 Because of this, any international intervention was considered as a 
violation of states‟ sovereignty.  
Whatever these reasons may, under international law, the first unsuccessful attempt to establish 
individual criminal responsibility was made by the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919.
6
 However, it 
was firmly established by the Nuremberg charter,
7
 which is correctly depicted as „a birth 
certificate of ICL‟.8 In the Nuremberg trial it was stated that ‘Crimes against international law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit 
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.’‟9 This oft-cited statement of 
the trial was adopted by the UNGA
10
 and has been serving as a fundamental principle of ICL. In 
general, this trial marked the end of the time when individuals shield behind an entity and went 
unpunished for their dreadful conduct.    
                                                 
2
 Cryer, Friman & Robinson et al An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 2ed (2010) 361. 
3
 Werle & Jessberger Principles of International Criminal Law 3ed (2014) 1.  
4
 Tomuschat C „The Legacy of Nuremberg‟ (2004) 4 JICJ 837. 
5
 Shaw M International Law 5ed (2003) 25.    
6
 Versailles Peace Treaty (1919) Arts. 227-231. See also, Tomuschat C (2004) 831.   
7
 Principles of International Law, the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal (1950)  
  principle 1.   
8
 Werle & Jessberger (2014) 14.  
9
 IMT, Judgement (1946) 447.  
10
 United Nation General Assembly Resolution 95(I) (1946).  
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However, since the crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC
11
 are committed by a 
systematised and networked group of persons
12
 who might be supported by gigantic hand of 
oligarchical governments,
13
 the actual implementation of this principle has been difficult. 
Briefly, in the commission of core crimes, there could be plurality of persons that make the plan, 
give order, and/or provide weapons, round up detainees and at the end of the chain someone who 
pulls the trigger.
14
 Consequently, identifying the individual‟s contribution and weighting it is a 
herculean task. It is difficult to establish the mode of responsibility that the person have 
participated and tell the implication behind it. Indeed, these issues were not a serious problem 
during the military and their follow up trials.
15
 They got momentum when the ad hoc tribunals 
came up and provided the modes of responsibility in a relatively nuanced way.
16
 Albeit the ICC 
Statute has a more detailed provision than both the military and ad hoc tribunals,
 17
 the above 
bewildering issues on modes of responsibility reached their zenith following its Article 25(3).   
Hence, in this thesis, the author scrutinises the modes of responsibility stipulated under Article 
25(3) of the ICC Statute in view of the approaches of making distinction among each other and 
the existence or otherwise of degree of blameworthiness. To this end, the author carries out a 
comparative study in light of selected common and civil law countries.   
                                                 
11
 Art. 5, the ICC Statute.   
12
 Jain N „The Control Theory of Perpetration in International Criminal Law‟ (2011) 12 CJIL 159.    
13
 Werle G „Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute‟ (2007) 5 JICJ 953.   
14
 Cryer, Friman & Robinson et al (2010) 361. See also, Wirth S „Committing Liability in International Criminal  
   Law‟ in Stahn & Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of The International Criminal Court (2009) 329. 
15
 Finnin S Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability: Article 25 (3)(B) and (C) Of the International Criminal   
   Court (2012) 12.   
16
 Werle & Jessberger (2014) 195. 
17
 Eser A „Individual Criminal Responsibility: Mental Element – Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law‟ In Cassese,  
   Gaeta & Jones The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 786. See also,  
   Stephens P „Collective Criminality and Individual Responsibility: The Constraints of Interpretation‟ (2014) 37  
   FordhamIntlLJ 2 517.   
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1.3 Research Problem  
In this paper, the author focuses on the following problems:  
I. Since one among the unsettled issues under the jurisprudence of ICL is how to distinguishing 
the modes of responsibility, it is the first focus of the thesis; and, 
II. The implication behind Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute, if any, is also uncertain. It is 
perplexing whether there is degree of blameworthiness amongst the modes of responsibility. 
Hence, ascertaining the question of degree of blameworthiness under the ICC jurisprudence is 
the second focus of the thesis.   
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
1.4.1 General Objective 
The general objective of this study is to scrutinise the modes of responsibility envisaged in 
Article 25 of the ICC Statute with a special emphasis on the approaches of differentiating them, 
and the raison d'etre behind their listing, if any.    
1.4.2 Specific Objectives 
The following are the specific objectives of this thesis: 
I. It aims to scrutinise the means of drawing a line between the modes of responsibility.  
II. It targets to examine the existence or otherwise of degree of blameworthiness among those 
modes of responsibility.    
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III. It seeks to conduct a comparative study on the above issues in light of both civil law and 
common law legal traditions.  
1.5 Research Questions 
The research questions that this thesis pursues to answer are:  
I. What is the proper way of understanding Article 25 of the ICC Statute? 
II. What is the right approach to distinguishing the modes of responsibility, if there is a need to 
do so? and, 
III. What is the nexus between Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute and degree of blameworthiness, if 
any?   
1.6 Literature Review 
Under ICL, modes of responsibility are not an untouched or exhaustively discussed area. There 
are several scholarly works. For example, Werle in his work titled, „Individual Criminal 
Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute‟; and, Ohlin, Sliedregt & Weigend in their work 
entitled, „Assessing the Control-Theory‟ has discussed some issues of individual criminal 
responsibility. Moreover, Ambos has made his commentary on Article 25 of the ICC Statute. 
However, irrespective of the presence of such works, the issues on modes of responsibility are 
not settled.   
Consequently, none of the existing works can be a bar for this thesis. They will all enrich it. 
Because, besides this thesis is aimed to find an ameliorating solution which can ease the existing 
tension; first, most of the existing works were not written in light of comparative study which 
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comprises both civil and common law countries. Secondly, the issues selected for this thesis are 
still unsettled both in and outside the court. Hence, the author believes that there is still a need to 
make further research and settle the jurisprudence.   
1.7 Research Methodology 
This thesis is a qualitative desktop research. Accordingly, in order to meet its objective, the 
author primarily approaches the research questions in the following ways:  
I. Analysis of primary sources such as the ICC‟s legal texts, cases, domestic laws, etc. 
II. Analysis of secondary sources like books, journal articles, internet sources, etc.   
1.8 Significances of the Study 
This thesis has the following main significances: 
I. Since the issues on modes of responsibility are not settled under international criminal justice 
system, this study plays a particular importance in the attempt to resolve the problems. 
Specifically, it will address the question of approaches of making distinction, and degrees of 
blameworthiness among the modes of responsibility under the ICC Statute.     
II. It serves as a reference material on individual criminal responsibility in general and modes of 
responsibility in particular.   
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1.9 Delimitation of the Study 
As the nomenclature of the thesis signifies, its focus is on the unsettled issues of modes of 
responsibility under Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute. Thus, its realm confines on the means of 
discerning the modes of responsibility, and degree of blameworthiness. Moreover, besides issues 
related with mens rea, the military trials, ad hoc tribunals, and hybrid courts are out of the ambit 
of this paper. These jurisprudences are consulted only for the sake of clarification.   
1.10 Organization of the Thesis   
The thesis has five chapters, this first chapter being this introductory part. The second chapter 
explains modes of responsibility under the ICC legal framework. This chapter started by 
assessing the status of the modes of responsibility during the pre-ICC period in view of the main 
issues of the thesis. The third chapter has two parts. While the first section delves with the main 
models of criminal participation, the second section is devoted to a comparative study of selected 
common and civil law countries. The fourth chapter, having the previous chapters as a 
background, scrutinises the uncertainties on the modes of responsibility. Finally, the fifth chapter 
provides the conclusion and recommendations.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. MODES OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
ICL proscribes some conducts as crimes and hold their perpetrators individually responsible. The 
ICC Statute, besides such serious crimes of concern, provides the modes via which the offenders 
could participate in the commission of such crimes and liable for punishment.
18
 The focus of this 
thesis is the modes of responsibility under the ICC Statute specifically in view of the approaches 
of making distinction and degrees of blameworthiness. Accordingly, this chapter first provides 
the groundwork by elaborating the various modes of responsibility under the Statute. However, 
for the sake of better understanding and to have a full picture of the issues, the author also found 
it apposite to make a generic discussion of the pre-ICC Statute period. Therefore, while the first 
section explores the modes of responsibility‟s status in the pre-ICC Statute, specifically in light 
of the above main issues, the second section discuss them under the ICC Statute.  
2.1 Pre-Rome Statute 
Modes of responsibility denote the connecting principles that relate the conduct of an offender to 
the execution of a crime.
19
 They are not about the elements of the crimes. They are about how 
the offenders participate in the commission of the crimes. Concerning such international crimes, 
the first unsuccessful prosecution was for „a supreme offence against international morality and 
the sanctity of treaties‟20 against the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, following the 1919 Versailles 
Peace Treaty. Albeit this treaty can be a starting point for discussing the development of ICL, it 
                                                 
18
 Art. 25(3), the ICC Statute    
19
 Ohlin J „Second Order Linking Principles: Combining Horizontal and Vertical Modes of Liability: International  
   Law and Practice‟ (2013) LJIL 2.  
20
 Art. 227, the Versailles Peace Treaty.  
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stated nothing about the possible modes of responsibility that the perpetrators could have been 
charged. It provided only about the establishment of a „High Tribunal‟. 21  Hence, by 
extrapolation, it is possible to say that the treaty gave less attention to modes of responsibility. 
Proceeding to the military trials, unlike the Versailles Peace Treaty, they had provisions on the 
modes of responsibility.
22
 However, their rules were only „rudimentary and fragmentary‟.23 In 
other words, they were not systematic but mere enumerations and intertwined with the definition 
of the crimes.
24
 What is more, the military trials did not make a distinction among the modes of 
responsibility.
25
 The other related legal instrument was the Control Council Law No. 10. This 
law provided a uniform legal basis for the trials conducted in the four occupation Zones of 
Germany.
26
 Under this law, by contrast with the IMT and its sibling IMTFE, albeit no separate 
importance accorded to the modes of responsibility and some rules were still part of the 
definition of the crimes,
27
 the modes were better systematised and elaborated. For the first time, 
there were specific provisions devoted to regulate the principal and accessorial responsibilities 
under ICL.
28
  
Moving to the ad hoc tribunals, compared to the aforementioned laws, they have presented 
nuanced modes of responsibility and have made distinction among the modes of responsibility.
29
 
Moreover, though it was controversial, the JCE notion was developed
30
 whereby distinction 
                                                 
21
 Arts. 227-231, the Versailles Peace Treaty.   
22
 IMT Charter (1945) Art. 6.  See also, IMTFE Charter (1946), Art. 5.  
23
 Werle & Jessenberg  (2014)  194. See also, Werle G (2007) 955.  
24
 Art. 6(a)(c), IMT Charter & Art. 5(a)(c), IMFFE Charter. See also, Werle & Jessenberg (2014) 194.  
25
 Werle & Jessenberg (2014) 195.  
26
 The Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (1945). 
27
 Art. II(1)(a), the Control Council Law No. 10.  
28
 Art. II(2), the Control Council Law No. 10.  
29
 The Statute of the ICTY (1993) Art. 7(1). See also, The Statute of the ICTR (1994) Art. 6(1).  
30
 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, ICTY (AC) IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgement (15 July 1999).       
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among the co-participants is made based on the parties‟ mens rea. 31  Interestingly, though 
inconsistent,
32
 there were also questions on the degree of blameworthiness. For example, in 
Mitar Vasiljević case, the Appeals Chamber stated that „aiding and abetting is a form of 
responsibility which generally warrants a lower sentence than is appropriate to responsibility as 
a co-perpetrator.‟33 Accordingly, the chamber mitigated the punishment from 20 to 15 years. In 
Radislav Krstic case too, the appeal chamber reduced the sentence from 46 to 35 for aiding and 
abetting genocide.
34
 Akin to the hierarchy made between the principals and secondary 
participants in the Vasiljević and Krstic cases, in the case of secondary participants, there was 
also a trend of considering ordering and instigating higher in responsibility than aiding and 
abetting.
35
       
To sum up, during the pre-ICC period, moving from the Versailles Peace Treaty to the ad hoc 
tribunals, better emphasis have been given to the modes of responsibility in a progressive way. 
Concisely, though contentious, specifically during the ad hoc tribunals, there was question how 
to make a distinction and degrees of blameworthiness among the modes of responsibility, 
especially between the principals and the secondary participants as well as among the secondary 
participants themselves. However, there were no similar discussions on the modes of 
responsibility found under the same category in a single sub-article: among aider and abetter, 
among the direct perpetrator and joint perpetrator, etc.   
                                                 
31
 Tadic Appeal Judgement (1999) 191-192. See also, Olasolo H „Developments in the Distinction between  
    Principal and Accessorial Liability In Light Of the First Case of the International Criminal Law‟ in Stahn &  
    Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (2009) 349.   
32
 Werle & Burghardt „Establishing Degrees of Responsibility: Modes of Participation in Article 25 of the ICC  
    Statute‟ in Sliedregt & Vasiliev (eds) Pluralism in International Criminal Law (2014) 309. See also, Sliedregt E  
   „Perpetration and Participation in Article 25(3)‟ in Stahn C (ed) The Law and Practice of the International     
    Criminal Court (2015) 514.  
33
 The Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljević, ICTY (AC) IT-98-32-A, Appeal Judgment (25 February 2004) 182.   
34
 The Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, ICTY (AC) IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgment (19 April 2004) 275.   
35
 See, Werle & Burghardt in Sliedregt & Vasiliev (eds) (2014) 310.    
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2.2 Rome Statute 
Under the ICC Statute, the modes of responsibility are provided under Article 25(3). This 
provision lists the modes of responsibility under four sub-articles. In the Statute, nothing is said 
concerning the reason for listing them or how to distinguishing among each other. As explained 
subsequently, these modes of responsibility can be categorised as referring to perpetrators and 
secondary participants.     
2.2.1 Perpetrator/Commission   
As discussed below, under the ICC legal framework, direct perpetration, joint perpetration, 
indirect perpetration, and as argued in different cases indirect co-perpetration are the principal 
modes of responsibility.    
2.2.1.1 Direct Perpetration  
Direct perpetrator,
36
 the classical mode of responsibility, occurs when the offender execute the 
actus reus element of the crime in person with the required mens rea.
 37
 However, if the person 
failed to discharge the actus reus in person, the next immediate options are commission as co or 
indirect perpetration. This signifies that commission is not exclusively about direct perpetration. 
There can be commission even when the person participated in an indirect way.  
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Art. 25(3)(a), the ICC Statute.  
37
 Schabas W An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 4ed (2011) 226. 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
2.2.1.2 Co-Perpetration  
Co-perpetration
38
 requires the presence of a plurality of persons who share a common plan and 
contribute to the consummation of the crime.
39
 In co-perpetration, there is an imputation of the 
actus rues of the crime. The actus rues committed by one member among the group ascribed to 
all. However, there is no similar attribution of the mens rea of the crime.
40
 All of the joint 
participant must fulfil the mens rea provided for the crime.  
Co-perpetration is different from the ad hoc tribunals‟ JCE. While the former gives much 
emphasis to the objective element of the crime and require an essential contribution (the JCE 
requires a significant contribution), the latter gives high emphasis to the subjective element; i.e., 
only intent in the sense of purpose suffices (the co-perpetration simply requires the same one that 
is also sufficient for individual commission).
41
   
2.2.1.3 Indirect Perpetration 
Indirect perpetration
42
 presupposes the existence of a witting or unwitting person via whom the 
actus reus element of the crime is committed.
43
 The rationale behind this mode is that „the 
perpetrator behind the perpetrator is responsible because s/he controls the will of the direct 
perpetrator‟.44 Accordingly, the indirect perpetrator is criminally responsible as if he/she has 
committed the actus reus.
45
 Further, for the liability of the indirect perpetrator, the liability of the 
                                                 
38
 Art. 25(3)(a), the ICC Statute.   
39
 Ambos K „Article 25- Individual Criminal Responsibility‟ in Triffterer O (eds)  Commentary on the Rome Statute  
   of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article  2ed (2008) 479.  
40
 Werle & Jessberger (2014) 207.  
41
 See, Wirth S „Co-perpetration in the Lubanga Trial Judgment‟ (2012) 10 JICJ 974-976.   
42
 Art. 25(3)(a), the ICC Statute. 
43
 Ambos in Triffterer O (eds) (2008) 478.  
44
 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngujolo Chui, ICC (PTC) 01/04-01/07-717, Confirmation of  
    Charges (30 September 2008) 497. 
45
 Ambos in Triffterer O (eds) (2008) 478.  
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agent is immaterial.
46
 The responsibility of the indirect perpetrator is independent of the agent. 
However, the use of a criminal agent in an indirect perpetration makes it confusing with other 
modes such as instigation, and ordering.    
2.2.1.4 Indirect Co-Perpetration    
The ICC Statute does not expressly stipulate indirect co-perpetration. Indirect co-perpetration, 
besides relying on the Roxin‟s theory of „dominance over an organisation‟,47 is an eclectic of co 
and indirect perpetration.
 
In Katanga and Chui case, the PTC reads the word „or‟ between the 
last two expressly provided alternative modes of commission under Article 25(3)(a) as 
„inclusive‟.48 However, this edifice of the Court has no unanimous acceptance. For example, in 
the same case, Judge Wyngaert opined that the mode is “a radical expansion” of Article 25(3)(a) 
and are not acceptable.  
2.2.2 Secondary Participants  
2.2.2.1 Solicits, Induces or Orders   
Though the ICC Statute does not define the concepts of inducing and soliciting, both refer the 
idea of causing a specific person to commit a specified criminal conduct.
49
 They also contain 
intellectual element of persuading another person and element of force.
50
 Hence, it is difficult to 
draw a borderline between them. In the ICC context, they fall under a generic notion called 
instigation and defined as „prompting another person to commit a crime‟.51 However, for the 
                                                 
46
 Art. 25(3)(a), the ICC Statute.  
47
 Sliedregt E. in Stahn C (ed) 509.  
48
 Katanga and Chui Confirmation of Charges (2008) 491.  
49
 Timmermann W Incitement in International Law (2015) 228.  
50
 Timmermann W (2015) 228. See also, Ambos in Triffterer O (eds) (2008) 480-481.    
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academia, inducement is broader than solicit.
52
 In both cases, however, subordinate-superior 
relationship is not a necessary requirement.
53
 Further, the instigator is different from the indirect 
perpetrator for the reason that while the former always use a responsible person, the latter may 
use both witting and unwitting persons.
54
 Unlike the ad hoc tribunals,
55
 under the ICC 
jurisprudence, as an actus reus element, the one who instigates another person is not required to 
make an „essential contribution‟; similarly, as a mens rea, it is sufficient for the instigator to be 
cognisant of the „substantial likelihood‟ that a crime would result from her/his conduct.56   
Besides the above modes, the ICC Statute recognises ordering.
57
 In ordering, the superior uses 
the subordinate as a means to commit a crime.
58
 It signifies the situation when the subordinate is 
treated as a direct perpetrator in Article 25(3)(a) and the superior grouped in Article 25(3)(b) as 
secondary mode. Owing to this, ordering has provoked a debate. For example, Ambos contends 
that commission of a crime by ordering another to do something, in a situation where a person 
can commit an act through a guilty as well as an innocent agent, is an example of perpetration 
„through another person‟.59 Therefore, for him, ordering should have been categorised under 
Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute in particular as „commission through another person‟.60 Eser, 
in support of Ambos, opines that the inclusion of ordering under Article 25(3)(b) is superfluous 
and degrades perpetration to mere complicity.‟61 On the other hand, there is an argument that 
                                                 
52
 Eser in Cassese, Gaeta & Jones (eds) (2002) 797. See also, Ambos in Triffterer O (eds) (2008) 480-481.     
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    (2015) 538.   
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what is provided under Article 25(3)(b) of the ICC Statute is an „ordinary cases of criminal 
ordering‟ wherein there is no „automatic compliance‟.62 The ordering in the sense of „automatic 
compliance‟ is within the preview of „commission through another person‟.63 Though by no 
means it is easy to decide, the author accepts the second line of argument and supports the 
inclusion of ordering under Article 25(3)(b) instead of Article 25(3)(a). This approach rightly 
explains the scenarios where someone could be when s/he received an order from a superior. Put 
differently, the mental state of the person who accepts the order under Article 25(3)(b) is 
different from Article 25(3)(b). While in the latter case the person has the option to say 
„NO/YES‟, under the first scenario there is only one option which is „YES‟ and act.   
Finally, it is worth considering that ordering in Article 25(3)(b) is different from responsibility 
pursuant to Article 28 of the Statue. Under Article 28, unlike Article 25(3)(b), responsibility 
depends on effective control and require a lower mens rea.
64
 Furthermore, while Article 28 is 
about omission, Article 25(3)(b) does not necessary require a formal superior-subordinate 
relationship.
65
   
Generally, all the above three secondary modes have in common that the participants do not 
execute the crime by themselves, but solicits, induces or order another person to do it. Besides, 
the blurry situation of soliciting and inducing, the inclusion of the orderer in the same group with 
secondary participants trigger the need to have an apt approach of making distinction.   
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2.2.2.2 Aiding, Abetting, or Otherwise Assists  
Though it is common to treat aiding and abetting as one notion, the terms are not similar. For 
instance, according to ICTR jurisprudence, while aiding refers to „giving assistance to someone‟, 
abetting denotes „facilitating the commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto.66 However, 
there is disagreement as to whether the ICC should adopt the same understanding of these 
concepts.
67
 The author concurs with the trend of treating the two notions differently as the same 
as the ad hoc tribunals‟ jurisprudence. Besides the general mens rea requirement, under the ICC 
Statute, the aider and abettor should perform the actus reus with the „purpose of facilitating‟ the 
materialisation of the crime.
68
 This additional subjective requirement indicates that the required 
mens rea is beyond the ordinary rule of Article 30. The person must provide the contribution 
with the purpose of facilitating the commission of the committed or attempted crime. Cassese, 
alleging that this additional subjective requirement narrowed the concept of aiding and abetting 
by making the mens rea tantamount to shared intent, consider it as ill fated.
69
     
Finally, it is worth noting that Article 25(3)(c) does not restrict the modes of responsibility only 
to aiding and abetting. The phrasing of the provision suggests that aiding and abetting are mere 
subsets of a wider category of assistance.   
 
 
                                                 
66
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2.2.2.3 Contribution to a Group Crime 
This mode of responsibility has no correspondence at international customary law
70
 and 
enshrined under Article 25(3)(d) of the Statute. The provision started with a connecting phrase 
„in any other way‟ which indicates that the provision is intended to govern the situations that do 
not fall under the previous sub-articles of the provision. It regulates the situation when a group of 
persons acting with a common purpose contributes to a committed or attempted crime. 
Nevertheless, what constitute a group is not clear and has been a point of contention within the 
Court.
71
 Moreover, the contribution should be intentional „with the aim of furthering the criminal 
activity or criminal purpose of the group‟ or „in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime‟. 72  Concerning the contribution, in the Mbarushimana case, the pre-trial 
chamber explained that it should be „at least significant‟.73 Moreover, it is not necessary for the 
person to be a member of the group. Further, the Court besides considering it as „residual form of 
accessory liability‟74 alleged that this provision works when a person contributes after the crime 
has already been committed.
75
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Summary  
This chapter, besides showing the journey of the modes of responsibility from the Versailles 
Peace Treaty to the contemporary ICC Statute, discussed the modes of responsibility under the 
ICC Statute. Moving from the military tribunals to the ICC Statute, besides adherence to 
categorisation of modes of responsibility, the ICC Statute is relatively comprehensive and 
detailed but is still imperfect. Apart from the difficulty to crystallise the exact boundary of some 
of the modes of responsibility provisions (like Articles 25(3)(c) and 25(3)(d)), akin to the 
implication behind the listing of Article 25(3), the Statute says nothing on how to distinguishing 
these modes of responsibility among each other. Hence, there is unwavering need to determine 
the apt theory of making distinction and the existence or otherwise of degrees of 
blameworthiness among the modes of responsibility. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE MODES OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDER 
SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Before indulging in a specific discussion of the modes of responsibility under selected common 
and civil law countries, the author finds necessary to highlights the models of criminal 
participation as a prelude. Accordingly, the first part of this chapter is devoted to it.     
3.1 A General Glimpse of the Models of Criminal Participation  
The models of criminal participation are important to determine who is responsible, in what 
capacity and degree of blameworthiness. Albeit they are several, since they are interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing, in this thesis, the author discusses the two most important models.  
3.1.1 Unitary Model  
This model connotes that all participants in the execution of a crime are personally responsible 
for their respective contribution.
76
The model does not anticipate the commission of a single 
offence by a plurality of persons. If there is an involvement of a plurality of persons, what could 
happen is a commission of a multiplicity of crimes.
77
 Regardless of the weight of their 
contribution, all of them are principals.
78
 Under the unitary model, there is no derivative 
liability.
79
 Responsibility does not presuppose the attempt of a criminal conduct by another 
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person.
80
 All participants are answerable for the punishment provided for the proper crime.
81
 In 
light of making distinction as principal and secondary participant, a unitary model can be 
„functional‟ or „pure‟. Though in both cases there is no derivative liability, unlike the pure 
unitary model, the functional unitary model recognises a formal distinction between the 
perpetrators and secondary participant.
82
  
Generally, the unitary model provides only the response to the question of who is individually 
answerable to the crime and does not make any further distinction on modes of responsibility for 
bearing responsibility. Countries such as Austria, Norway, and Italy recognised this model under 
their criminal law.
83
 At the international arena, the military trials did employ it to criminalise the 
Nazi leadership.
84
    
3.1.2 Differentiation Model 
Unlike the unitary model, the differentiation model recognises the distinction of the participants 
in the commission of the crime.
85
 There is distinction between those who actually commit the 
crime and those involved in supplementary capacity.
86
 While the responsibility of the principal 
offenders is emanates from their own acts, the secondary participants‟ responsibility derives 
from the consummated or at least attempted criminal act of the principal.
87
 Accordingly, in this 
model, there is derivative liability. It accepts the possible existence of plurality of people who 
may have a role in the execution of the crime. Hence, unlike the pure unitary model, under the 
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differentiation model, not all of the participants are principals. While some could be are 
principal, the other some could be secondary participants. Likewise, since the liability of the 
secondary participant is contingent on the principal, unlike the unitary model, there is also an 
argument for the existence of degree of blameworthiness wherein the latter is more responsible 
than the former.    
Countries such as France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Croatia adopted the differentiation 
model.
88
 At the international level, there is a shift to this model since the ad hoc tribunals.
89
    
To conclude, both the unitary and differentiation models are accepted. Besides differentiating the 
participant in the commission of the crime as principal and secondary, their main difference lies 
on the source of the participants‟ responsibility. While the unitary model makes the 
responsibility of all participants independent, the differentiation model, besides distinguishing 
the principal and secondary participants, implies dependence of the secondary participants‟ 
responsibility on the principal‟s criminal conduct. Consequently, based on this distinction, whilst 
the unitary model consider the entire participant as perpetrator and argue for them to receive 
similar punishment, the differentiation model categorises the participants in the commission of 
crime into principal and secondary and indicates degree of blameworthiness. However, worthy 
considering that as the author calls larvae of differentiation model, the „functional unitary model‟ 
recognises a formal distinction among the principal and the secondary participants. Furthermore, 
conceptually, it should be worth noting that the degrees of blameworthiness is implicated only 
among the principals and secondary participates where the secondary participates‟ liability is 
derivative of the former.    
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3.2 A Comparative Study   
The purpose of this comparative study is not to oblige the ICC to follow a domestic legal 
tradition. The Court is not and should not be under duty to do so. However, it is also not 
completely wrong if it borrows from a domestic legal tradition. Undeniably, international 
tribunals often inspired and shaped by domestic standards.
90
 However, as Judge Fulford 
argued,
91
 if there is such a need, it should be after a careful assessment of the policy 
considerations underlying the domestic legal doctrine and its compatibility with the international 
criminal justice system.   
Comparative study is vital for three main reasons.
92
 First, since principles that are developed 
consistent with the „general principles of law recognised by civilised nations‟ have a higher 
chance to be a genuine source of international law than a principle lend from a single country or 
few countries, it allows ICL to assess such principle and built its legitimacy on a firm ground. 
Secondly, exploring diverse legal traditions permits to discover the best solution for the 
multifaceted factual and legal problems and then eases the difficulties created because of 
problems of understanding between common and civil lawyers. Lastly, it is justified by Article 
21(c) of the ICC Statute that allows the interpretation of the Statute in light of domestic law of 
states that would normally exercise jurisdiction.  
Consequently, to conduct the comparative study, whereas Germany and Ethiopia are chosen 
from the civil law tradition, United Kingdom and United States are selected from the common 
law tradition. These countries are chosen based on, besides the attempt to see the view of non-
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member states like Ethiopia, their strong nexus with the birth and development of ICL and their 
legal tradition‟s influence on the world‟s legal system.  
3.2.1 Civil Law Legal Tradition   
3.2.1.1 Germany  
Germany has signed the ICC Statute on 10 December 1998, ratified it on 11 December 2000,
93
 
and enacted the ICC Statute Implementation Act on 1 July 2002. Until this Act entered into 
force, all criminal matters in Germany were governed by the German Criminal Code. However, 
the Act does not totally proscribe the application of the Criminal Code.
94
 It allows the application 
of the Code‟s general rules such as on the modes of responsibility. Therefore, this discussion on 
the German legal tradition on the modes of responsibility focuses on the rules that found in their 
criminal code. The German Criminal Code provides the modes of responsibility from Section 25 
to 31. These sections categorise the participant in the commission of a crime in two broad 
categories: Principal and Accessories.      
The German Criminal Code provides three scenarios that perpetrators participate as a principal 
offender. These are when the person physically commits the offence; via another person; and, 
jointly with another person.
95
 In the direct perpetrator, the person commits the actus reus element 
of the crime personally with the required mens rea.
96
 In the second form, indirect perpetration,
97
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the person commits the actus reus element of the crime via another person.
98
 In this respect, two 
scenarios can exist.
99
 First, the situation when the person absolutely controls the agent and the 
latter may be exonerated from criminal responsibility; and secondly, the exceptional situation 
where the agent is held liable together with the principal despite the principal‟s domination over 
the act.
100
 Moving to the third form, the commission of the crime is not left to one or some of the 
participants only but for all;
101
 i.e., there should be a common plan subscribed by all 
participants.
102
 The common plan does not need an overt discussion between the joint 
participants and arranged in advance.
103
 Moreover, not all the co-perpetrators are required to be 
at the scene of the crime.
104
   
Proceeding to the accessories, they include aiding, and abetting.
105
 Generally, the following 
conditions are necessary for the existence of aiding, and abetting.
106
 These are:   
I. There must be an intentional assistance or inducement in or to the principal‟s intentional 
unlawful act. This means that there is no negligent abetting or assistance
107
 and there is no aiding 
or abetting if the criminal conduct is not the result of the intentional conducts of the principal. 
Moreover, in the case of abetting, the abettor must be the one who induces the commission of the 
crime. 
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II. While the actus reus of the abettor is any act that can cause the principal to take her/his 
decision to commit a crime, the actus reus of the aider could be any kind of act that further the 
act of the perpetrator(s).   
Further, the German Code of Crimes against International Law provides that „Whoever commits 
an offence pursuant to Sections 8 to 14 in execution of a military order or of an order 
comparable in its actual binding effect shall have acted without guilt so far as the perpetrator 
does not realise that the order is unlawful and so far as it is also not manifestly unlawful.‟108 
According to this provision, the person who receives an order might not be criminal responsible. 
Besides the binding nature of the order, the subordinates‟ liability is dependent on their 
knowledge about the illegality of the order and its noticeability. Albeit the subordinates are 
unwitting about the illegality of the order, they may be criminally responsible if the order‟s 
unlawfulness is easily noticeable. However, inherently the provision does not suggest the 
situation when the subordinate is more liable than the superior‟s liability. Further, the German 
law recognises some kinds of criminal conspiracy, in cases were two or more persons agree on 
committing a crime.
109
     
The German Criminal Code, alike the ICC Statute, distinguishes participants as principal and 
accessory, and is silent on the means of making distinction. Accordingly, there have been 
attempts by the German Federal Court of Justice and criminal law commentators to develop 
various theories. Consequently, the objective theory, the subjective theory, and, the control over 
the crime theory have been propounded.
110
 Currently, of these theories, the German legal 
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tradition has adopted the control over the crime theory (in German “Tatherrschaft”) which was 
first systematised by Claus Roxin.
111
  
Moving to the degree of blameworthiness, akin to some domestic criminal laws like the Swiss 
Criminal Code,
112
 the German Criminal Code provides that the aider have a mandatory statutory 
discount during sentencing.
113
 However, similar mandatory mitigation is not available for an 
abettor.
114
 This absence of mitigation for the abettor has two immediate suggestions. First, it 
makes the existence of absolute degree of blameworthiness between principals and secondary 
participants murky. Because, there is an apparent possibility in which the abettor may receive 
equal or greater punishment than the principal. The same confusion also exists between aider and 
abettor. Secondly, it speaks that the mere recognition of a differentiation model of criminal 
participation does not necessarily imply an immediate implication on degrees of 
blameworthiness.   
Generally, the German legal tradition recognises a differentiation model wherein the control over 
the crime theory serves as a means to distinguishing the modes of responsibility. However, it is 
necessary to note that the German law does not recognise an absolute degree of 
blameworthiness. Further, the law is silent whether there is hierarchical relation or not among the 
modes of responsibility that are found under the same category; be it as principal (between the 
three forms) or secondary participants.    
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3.2.1.2 Ethiopia  
Though Ethiopia was an active participant in the establishment of the ICC, finally, along with 20 
other countries, it abstained from voting for the adoption of the Statute of the Court. Ethiopia has 
also, since then not acceded to the ICC Statute, in spite of accepting, in principle, the need for 
establishing an International Criminal Court.
115
 Accordingly, in Ethiopia, its domestic criminal 
law governs every criminal activity.   
Ethiopia has a Federal System of Government.
116
 However, in principle, the power to enact a 
criminal law is vests in the Federal Government.
117
 Consequently, the Federal Government has 
enacted a Criminal Code in 2004.
118
 This Code provides the modes of responsibility from 
Articles 32 to 40.
119
 These provisions crudely classify the participants in criminal conduct into 
two categories: Principal, and Secondary offenders.    
The Ethiopian Criminal Code provides three situations in which a person participates in criminal 
activity as principal offender. These are: Material Offender; Moral Offender; and, Indirect 
Offender. The material offender is the person who actually commits the crime either directly or 
indirectly.
120
 While the direct means is when the person commits the criminal conduct in person 
with the required mens rea, the indirect means refer to the situation in which the perpetrator 
employs animals or natural forces.
121
 Unlike the Ethiopia Criminal Code, the German legal 
tradition, does not explicitly mention this indirect way of participating as a material offender. 
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Moving to the moral offender, it denotes those persons who fully associate themselves with the 
commission of the crimes and the result intended but without performing the actus reus of the 
crime.
122
 These persons are called „working brains‟ and are principals and punishable as such, 
because, they fully associate themselves with the material offender‟s criminal act and adopt it as 
their own offence.
123
 The moral offender is not entirely about those persons who indirectly 
control the commission of the crime. It is about all persons who associates themselves in the 
commission of the criminal conduct and considers it as their activity. Hence, this Ethiopian mode 
of responsibility is a bit different from the German mode of responsibility called „commission 
through another person‟. Lastly, the indirect offender is the person who uses an infant, mentally 
deficient or a person who is ignorant of the situation as a means or forces others to commit 
crimes.
124
 This scenario is different from the indirect material offender provided under Article 
32(1)(a) by the nature of the instrument or agent used. While the indirect material offender under 
Article 32 (1)(a) uses means such as animals and non-living things, under Article 32(1)(c) the 
person uses human beings who are completely irresponsible for reasons including age and 
mental problem. This mode seems the German „commission through another person‟. However, 
the Ethiopian provision is different in the sense that it does not regulate the situation when the 
person uses an agent who is cognisant of the guilty act and performs the material element.
125
 
This follows from the close reading of Article 32(1)(a) & (c). These provisions talks only when 
the person uses inanimate and animate means but who are criminally irresponsible. Hence, it is 
one weakness of the Ethiopian criminal law in resolving international crimes. Besides these 
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modes, though it is not as express as the German Criminal Code, arguably, it is possible to say 
that there is a joint perpetration under the Ethiopian Criminal Code.
126
   
Moving to the secondary participants, they refer to incitement
127
 and accomplice. Accordingly, 
any person who „intentionally induces another person whether by persuasion, promises, money, 
gifts, and threats or otherwise to commit a crime‟128 and/or „assists a principal criminal either 
before or during the carrying out of the criminal design, whether by information, advice, supply 
of means or material aid or assistance of any kind whatsoever in the commission of a crime‟129 is 
responsible as a secondary participant. Akin to the German Criminal Code and the ICC Statute, 
under Ethiopian Criminal Code, the responsibility of the secondary participant presupposes the 
attempt of the criminal conduct by the principal.
130
   
The other secondary mode addressed under the Ethiopian Criminal Code is ordering. The only 
instance that is regulated under the Code is when there is an explicit order from an administrative 
or military superior who has competence to do so.
131
 In this case, criminal liability rests only on 
the superior if the subordinate did not exceed the order she/he has received.
132
 However, if the 
subordinate was aware of the illegality of the order, in particular, if she/he knew that the order 
was given without a lawful authority or has illegal nature, she/he will be responsible.
133
 
Moreover, if the subordinate intentionally exceeded the order, she/he will be alone responsible 
for the excess.
134
 The construction of ordering under the Ethiopian Criminal Code is similar to 
                                                 
126
 See, Art. 32(3) & 35, Ethiopian Criminal Code. 
127
 Note there is a nomenclature difference between the Ethiopian, German, and, the Rome Statute.   
128
 Art. 36(1), Ethiopian Criminal Code.  
129
 Art. 37(1), Ethiopian Criminal Code.  
130
 Art. 36(2) & Art 37(3), Ethiopian Criminal Code.  
131
 It is narrower than Article 25(3)(b) of the ICC Statute.  
132
 Art. 73, Ethiopian Criminal Code.   
133
 Art. 74(1), Ethiopian Criminal Code.  
134
 Art. 74(3), Ethiopian Criminal Code.  
 
 
 
 
30 
 
the German Code of Crimes against International Law. However, since the latter uses a broad 
phrase „in execution of a military order or of an order comparable in its actual binding effect‟, it 
is broader than the Ethiopian counterpart. Finally, alike the German legal tradition, the Ethiopian 
Criminal Code has exceptionally recognised conspiracy as a mode of responsibility.
135
   
Under Ethiopian Criminal Code, akin to the German legal tradition and the ICC Statute, there is 
no provision that indicates how to distinguish the modes of responsibility. Nevertheless, the 
close assessment of the express principal modes of responsibility designates the recognition of an 
eclectic of subjective and objective approaches. Since those persons who commit the actus reus 
of the crime is considered as a principal offender, there is an objective approach application. 
Moreover, regarding those persons who partake in the commission of the crime without 
committing the actus reus of the crime, unlike the German Criminal Code, the Ethiopian 
Criminal Code adopted a subjective approach. In this case, the question that needs to be 
answered to determine whether the person is a principal or not is, how much this person 
associated her/himself in the commission of the crime. If she/he fully associated (mentally) 
her/himself in the execution of the crime, she/he is a principal. Generally, though there is no an 
express indication, arguably, the Ethiopian Criminal Code‟s approach can be categorise as an 
eclectic of objective and subjective approaches.      
Ensuing to the degrees of blameworthiness, under the Ethiopian Criminal Code, there is no 
mandatory distinction between the responsibility of the principal and secondary offenders. In 
principle, the punishment provided to the secondary participants is the same as principals.
136
 
However, in the case of secondary participants, the Court is entitled to mitigate the punishment 
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within the limits specified by law.
137
 However, unlike the German Criminal Code that provides a 
mandatory mitigation of punishment for the aider, under the Ethiopian Criminal Code there is no 
mandatory mitigation of punishment and statutory distinction on the responsibility of the 
secondary participants. Owing to the permissive nature of the mitigation, it is unfitting to say that 
there is a scale of degrees of blameworthiness in the Ethiopian legal tradition. Besides, in the 
case of ordering, unlike the superior, the Criminal Code plainly provided that the subordinate‟s 
punishment could be mitigated without restriction.
138
 However, there is still a situation where the 
subordinate may receive the same punishment as the superior.   
Generally, like the German Criminal Code, the Ethiopian Criminal Code adopted a 
differentiation model but with eclectic means of distinguishing the modes of responsibility. 
Additionally, alike the German legal tradition, there is no absolute degree of blameworthiness. 
This strengthens the point that the mere adoption of differentiation model does not mean there is 
a degree of blameworthiness even among principal and secondary participants. Akin to the 
German equivalent, the Ethiopian Criminal Code is silent as to whether there is blameworthiness 
hierarchy among the case of modes of responsibility that found under the same category or not. 
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3.2.2 Common Law Legal Tradition   
3.2.2.1 United Kingdom  
As a common law country, in the UK, there is no comprehensive Criminal Code; instead, it 
mainly relies on judicial decisions.
139
 However, since the nineteenth century, legislative acts 
became the primary source of the UK criminal law.
140
 Besides this domestic move, the UK has 
signed the ICC Statute on 30 November 1998. The UK adopted the ICC implementation Act on 
11 May 2001 and entered into force on 1 September 2001.
141
 This Act is applicable in England, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland but not in Scotland. Though there is no significant difference, there 
is also a separate Act for Scotland.
142
 Concerning the modes of responsibility, besides others, the 
UK ICC implementation Act made a cross reference to the Accessories and Abettors Act of 
1861. The Criminal Law Act of 2007 amended this Act. According to these legal grounds, the 
UK legal tradition recognised both Principal and Accessorial modes of responsibility. 
Under the UK legal tradition, the person who directly executes the actus reus of the crime is 
called a principal in the first degree.
143
 Except its nomenclature, it is similar with the civil law 
countries‟, Ethiopia and Germany, direct perpetrator. Moreover, the UK jurisprudence also 
allows holding of two or more persons as co-perpetrators. Put differently, if each of them fulfils 
the actus reus element of the crime, and if each of them satisfies the necessary mens rea, all can 
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be designated as joint offenders.
144
 Furthermore, under the UK legal tradition, though an 
exception, indirect perpetration is the third type of principal mode, which demonstrates itself in 
the „doctrine of an innocent agency‟.145 Here, the perpetrator uses another third person who can 
be free from criminal responsibility.  
Moving to accessories, traditionally called second-degree participants, the Accessories and 
Abettors Act of 1861 mainly govern them. The Act provides that „whoever shall aid, abet, 
counsel or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at 
common law, or by virtue of any act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted 
and punished as a principal offender.‟146 In the accessorial modes sense, the words „aiding, 
abetting, counselling, and procuring‟ has their ordinary meaning. Moreover, the UK ICC 
Implementation Act introduced a list of ancillary offences that includes „aiding, abetting, 
counselling, procuring, inciting, attempting or conspiring, and assisting an offender or 
concealing the commission of an offence.‟147  
Under the UK legal tradition, although there is a formal distinction among the principal and 
accessories, the latter are not by themselves distinct offences.
148
 Their responsibility is 
derivative; i.e., it derives from the responsibility of the principal.
149
 Put differently, the 
accessories are guilty of the crime committed by the principal.  
                                                 
144
 Martin & Storey (2015) 113.   
145
 Martin & Storey (2015) 113.  
146
 The UK Accessories and Abettors Act (1861) Sec. 8. 
147
 See, UK ICC implementation Act (2001) chapter 17, Secs. 55(1)(a)-(d) & 62(a)-(d).   
148
 UK: Secondary Liability in the Criminal Law, available at  
     http://www.mondaq.com/x/136506/Crime/Secondary+Liability+In+The+Criminal+Law  (accessed 16 October  
     2015).  
149
 Jain N Perpetrators and Accessories in International Criminal Law: Individual Modes of Responsibility for  
     Collective Crimes (2014) 177.  
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Proceeding to the punishment, under the UK legal tradition, the accessories are liable as if they 
are a perpetrator of the criminal conduct, and receive the same punishment as the principal.
150
 
Any distinction between the principal and secondary participant is paltry. There is no mitigation 
recognised for the accessorial modes of responsibility. Unlike the civil law counterparts, 
Ethiopian and Germany, the punishment of the principal and accessories is identical. This is, 
arguably, a typical feature of the unitary model of criminal participation. However, the existence 
of a formal distinction among the principal and accessories while the latter‟s liability is 
contingent on the former‟s criminal conduct but without punishment difference, falls the UK 
legal tradition in between of the functional unitary model and differentiation model of criminal 
participation.    
Finally, since there is no degree of blameworthiness among the principals and accessories, for 
the stronger reason, there will be no hierarchical relationship between those found within the 
same category.       
3.2.2.2 United States of America  
Judge Hans-Peter Kaul opines that the US was the one that put the foundation stone for the 
development of ICL.
151
 However, irrespective of this contribution at the inception stage, they had 
refused to ratify the ICC Statute and remain a non-member State with a veto power in the UNSC. 
However, the US is a common law country, like the UK, its majority criminal law rules are the 
result of legislations. Under the US Constitution, unlike the Ethiopian „grundnorm’, the power to 
impose criminal responsibility almost exclusively is vests in the states. Today, almost every state 
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of the US has a Criminal Code.
152
 Because of this multiplicity of Criminal Codes, it is difficult to 
identify a single rule as an American principle of criminal law.
153
 However, as the result of the 
Model Penal Code of 1962 that influenced the codification process of most states‟ Criminal 
Codes,
154
 there are some shared similarities.
155
 Hence, this Code, more than any other Codes, is 
the closest instrument to reflect US‟s Criminal Code principles. Therefore, the author‟s 
discussion, apart from other possible necessary legislations and court decisions, is based on it. 
Accordingly, the US legal tradition recognises two broad modes of responsibility: Perpetrator, 
and Accomplice.  
Akin to other legal traditions, the perpetrators are those who fulfil the criminal act of the offence 
via their own conduct(s) or through the act of an innocent agent. Accordingly, under the US legal 
tradition, any person can participate in the commission of a crime as a principal in the following 
situations: as direct perpetrator who physically engages in the commission of the criminal 
conduct;
156
 and, as indirect perpetrator
 157
 who uses an unwitting person as a means to commit 
the crime.   
Moving to the Secondary participants, they are referred to as accomplices. An accomplice is any 
person, who, with the aim of stimulating or expediting the execution of the crime, solicits 
another person;
158
 or aids, agrees or attempts to aid another person in planning or committing the 
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crime.
159
 Accomplice also include a person who is under duty to prevent the commission of the 
crime but fails to make the necessary effort so to do with the aim of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of it.
160
 Albeit the crime is materialised by the principal‟s conduct, the principal‟s 
prosecution or conviction is not a condition precedent to make the accomplice liable.
161
 While 
unlike the civil countries and the UK legal tradition the accomplice‟s liability is independent 
from the principal; under the US legal tradition, alike the UK legal tradition, there is a formal 
distinction among the principal and accomplice. Moreover, like the UK legal tradition, the 
distinction between the principal and accomplice is nominal. There is no distinction in 
blameworthiness. In this regard, the US Crimes and Criminal Procedure read:
162
   
a. Whoever commits an offence against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, 
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. 
b. Whoever wilfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another 
would be an offence against the United States, is punishable as principal. 
Therefore, like UK legal tradition, under the US legal tradition the accomplice is subject to the 
same punishment provided to the principal. This identical punishment for the principals and 
secondary participants was adopted to rectify the shortcoming of the traditional objective 
approach of distinguishing the principal and the secondary participant, which is common in the 
common law countries like the UK and US.
163
 However, it is different from the civil law 
countries, German and Ethiopian, because, at least in their tradition there is discriminatory and 
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non-mandatory mitigation, respectively. These all shows the adoption of the unitary model of 
criminal participation in the US legal tradition though not still pure.
164
 
3.2.3 Trends in Domestic Legal Systems: In Search of a Common Dimension and Its 
Applicability to International Criminal Law 
 Out of 196, there are 123 states parties to the ICC Statute.
165
 These states parties are 
representatives of both common and civil law legal system and the ICL is the result of their 
compromise. Often, directly or indirectly, the theories adopted at international level are resulted 
from domestic arena. The rules on modes of responsibility are not different from this.  
Both in civil (Ethiopia and Germany) and common (the UK and US) law legal tradition, there is 
at least a tradition of making a formal distinction of the modes of responsibility as principal and 
secondary participants. Similarly, save the US legal tradition, the liability of the latter is 
contingent on the former. Put differently, the principal must at least attempt the criminal conduct. 
These trends of making at least a formal distinction in common law countries and the actual 
distinction in the civil law countries and derivative nature of accessories‟ responsibility indicate 
the fading of the pure unitary model but a worldwide move towards a differentiation model of 
criminal participation. However, both legal systems do not provide an explicit means of 
distinguishing the modes of responsibility. However, while it is possible to argue for an eclectic 
approach under the Ethiopian Criminal Code, the German Criminal Code upholds the control 
over the crime theory. The common law countries, on their part, espouse the subjective approach. 
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These facts show the absence of unanimously agreed theory on the means of distinguishing the 
modes of responsibility.    
Whatever the means of making distinction may, under both legal systems, there is difference on 
their stand on degree of blameworthiness. In the civil law countries, albeit not absolute, there is a 
scale of degrees of blameworthiness between principal and secondary participants wherein the 
former‟s responsibility is higher than the latter‟s. Moreover, there is a murky picture concerning 
the relation of those modes of responsibility designated as a secondary participant. For example, 
compared to the principal offenders, under the German legal tradition, while the aider has a 
mandatory mitigation, there is no similar mitigation for the abettor. Hence, it seems to connote 
that the abettor is more responsible than the aider. Furthermore, under the Ethiopian legal 
system, there is only non-mandatory mitigation for secondary participants. Accordingly, under 
the Ethiopian legal tradition, the issue of blameworthiness is blurry not only among the 
secondary participants but also between principals and secondary participants. However, there is 
no similar perplexing situation under the common law legal system. As explained under the UK 
and US legal systems, there is no degree of blameworthiness whatsoever. Moreover, both in civil 
law and common law countries, there is no trend of assessing blameworthiness relations among 
the modes of responsibility that are found under the same category like principal (as direct, co & 
indirect perpetrators).  
The stand of the common law legal system on degrees of blameworthiness coupled with its 
blurry situation under the civil law legal system signify the absence of an absolute degrees of 
blameworthiness relation in the modes of responsibility at the domestic arena, even among the 
principals and secondary participants. Besides, the mere acknowledgement of the differentiation 
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model of criminal participation or making distinction among the modes of responsibility does not 
assure the existence of degree of blameworthiness.
166
  
Noticeably, except showing the holistic picture of the issues at the domestic level, the above 
trends under national level cannot be directly transpose to the international criminal justice 
system. True, there is no inherently wrong and perfect domestic doctrine. However, the ICL 
should be vigilant and use a holistic approach when it consults domestic doctrines. The domestic 
trends, irrespective of to which legal system they belong, must be compatible with the 
international criminal justice framework.
167
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
166
 See, Cassese, Gaeta & Baig et al (2013) 162.  
167
 Cruz P Comparative Law in a Changing World 3ed (2007) 25.  
 
 
 
 
40 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
4. SCRUTINISING AND SETTLING THE DUST: THE MEANS OF DISTINGUISHING 
THE MODES OF RESPONSIBILITY AND DEGREE OF BLAMEWORTHINESS IN 
THE ROME STATUTE 
This chapter has two sections. While the first section crystallises the hitherto debates on the 
modes of responsibility, the second section analyses the specific arguments of the thesis.   
4.1 Establishing the Contemporary Outlooks on the Means of Distinguishing the Modes of 
Responsibility and Degree of Blameworthiness  
This section, preceded by a discussion on the relevance of distinguishing the modes of 
responsibility, provides the current views on the approaches of distinguishing the modes of 
responsibility and degrees of blameworthiness under ICL.   
4.1.1 The Relevance of Making Distinction 
As it is shown in the previous chapter, despite some jargon differences and is not as detailed as 
the ICC Statute is, both the common and civil law countries make a distinction among the modes 
of responsibility. However, this cannot be enough reason not to probe the relevance of making 
such distinction. Besides other reasons, the present call for the „end of „modes of liability‟‟ by 
academicians such as Stewart
168
 makes the question legitimate. Stewart questions that „could it 
not be possible to put an end to the highly complicated, seriously inefficient and frequently harsh 
development of modes of liability in international criminal justice by adopting a unitary theory of 
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participation that collapses all modes of liability into a single standard?‟.169 He advocates a pure 
unitary model of criminal participation whereby every participant in a crime is considered  to be 
a perpetrator without any further distinction.  
The author, for the ensuing illustrative justifications, considers apposite to make distinction 
among the modes of responsibility:   
I. General criminal law principles and transitional justice aspects    
Non-transmissibility of criminal responsibility is one among the fundamental principles of 
criminal law. It requires personal responsibility for once own guilty act;
 170 
i.e., all participants 
should be criminally responsible only for their own personal deeds.
171
 The other equally 
important principle is fairness, which demands the right labelling of offenders and punishes them 
depending on their wrongdoing. To respect these principles, it is necessary to pinpoint the 
specific contribution and in what capacity the person partook in the execution of the crime. 
Making a distinction among the modes of responsibility helps to know the specific role of the 
accused and makes them responsible to that extent.   
Besides these criminal law principles, the need to differentiate the modes of responsibility can be 
justified from transitional justice perspective. This is manifested in light of the complex nature of 
international criminal trials.
172
 Apart from the involvement of many peoples and the possible 
insufficiency of evidences, in the case of international crimes, the crime scenes are often spread 
out in time and space. These problems caused the risk of collective guilt. However, this risk of 
assigning guilt by association can be abated by making distinction among the modes of 
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responsibility. The distinction helps to impose criminal responsibility on those persons who 
actually committed the crime and avoided victors‟ justice blame.   
II. Human rights aspects  
The human rights aspects of distinguishing the modes of responsibility can be seen from two 
perspectives: from victims and accused aspect.  
ICL protects the interest of the international community by rendering a fair justice. The author 
believes that a meaningful justice cannot be served only by convicting and putting the criminals 
behind bars. The international community in general, and the specific direct victims in particular, 
should know how the crime was committed and in what capacity the offender participated in it. 
This is consonant with the prosecutor and the Court‟s duty to establish the truth.173 The victims 
should know who did what. Accordingly, differentiating the modes of responsibility is one 
means to fulfil this interest of the victims.     
From the defendant perspective, the issue relates with his/her procedural rights. The accused 
have the right to be properly informed about the nature of the charges brought against them. 
Unless the charge sufficiently defines their role in the commission of the crime, it would 
adversely affect their defence.
174
 Consequently, making a distinction among the modes of 
responsibility has a relevance to the fair trial rights of the accused.     
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III. „Expressive Justice‟ or Moral implications  
Albeit arguable, engaging in criminal conduct is a possible indication of moral decay.
175
 Nothing 
than moral deterioration better explains the unspeakable crimes, like what happened in Nazi 
Germany‟s concentration and extermination camps. Though the purpose of punishment is not 
palpable under ICL,
176
 rehabilitation can be taken as one of it.
177
 To effectively achieve this 
purpose, it is necessary to know what those persons specifically did and in what capacity they 
participated in the commission of the criminal conduct.   
Moreover, perpetrators of such heinous crimes are a threat to the international community. The 
more significant role someone plays in such crimes, the more those persons are dangerous and 
are at least morally responsible for the suffering sustained by the victims. Hence, these persons 
should be identified and stigmatised and bear the moral blame.
178
 Hence, making distinction 
among participants in the commission of a crime and categorising them as principal and 
secondary participant can serve this expressive function.
179
 It expresses who is dangerous and 
then at least morally more responsible for the inexpressible misery sustained by the victims.  
IV. Legitimacy   
Undoubtedly, distinguishing the modes of responsibility increases the transparency, 
accountability and predictability as well as the credibility of ICL.
180
 Moreover, the principle of 
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legality requires necessary steps to be taken to guarantee foreseeability of the law.
181
 If there is 
distinction, it inhibits the Court and other concerned organs from a mere hunch or an arbitrary 
application of the modes of responsibility.
 
As Ohlin, Sliedregt, and Weigend  argues, a judge, for 
example, cannot on Monday convict a defendant by „X‟ mode of responsibility, and on Tuesday 
convict another defendant of the same or very similar facts by „Y‟ mode of responsibility.182 This 
would affect the legitimacy of the Court. The existence or otherwise of transparency, 
predictability and accountability in the operation of the Court has correlative implications on the 
legitimacy of the Court. Hence, distinguishing the modes of responsibility is one of the means to 
build the legitimacy of the ICC. In this regard, to show the danger, the conventional tension 
between the ICC and Africa can be living evidence. Albeit its genuinity is dubious, African 
countries accuse the Court as it lacks uniformity and unduly focus on African leaders. Nothing 
will stop the explosion of the same tension if there is no transparency and predictability on the 
determination of the participants‟ modes of responsibility.183 Moreover, since under ICL the 
nexus between the offenders and the crimes are often blurry than the occurrence of the crimes 
themselves, the need of making and providing clear and distinguishable modes of responsibility 
is undisputable.
184
   
Overall, distinguishing the modes of responsibility can be justified by independent factors such 
as criminal law principles, human rights and transitional justice aspect as well as the purpose of 
ICL.  It should not be seen only from one facet, namely the degree of blameworthiness. Making 
distinction among the modes of responsibility has a relevance that is far beyond than the 
controversy on degree of blameworthiness. Degree of blameworthiness is one of the possible 
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justifications but not an immediate outcome of it. This is also reinforced by the comparative 
study of the previous chapter that illustrated the existence of at least a formal distinction among 
participants in the commission of a crime but without implication on degree of blameworthiness 
(in the UK and USA), and an actual distinction, but no absolute degrees of blameworthiness (in 
Ethiopia and Germany).       
4.1.2 Establishing the Current views on Approaches of Distinguishing the Modes of 
Responsibility    
Albeit there is no consensus, there are three main theories of distinguishing the modes of 
responsibility:
185
 subjective, objective, and, control over the crime theory.  
The objective theory looks into the actus reus of the crime. According to it, whilst those persons 
who directly committed the actus reus with the required mens rea are considered as principal, all 
other persons are secondary participants.
186
 Consequently, those persons who play a pivotal role 
behind the scene cannot be perpetrators. The subjective approach, adopted by the ICTY via the 
concept JCE,
187
focuses on the mens rea.
188
 Therefore, unlike the objective approach, it can 
encompass those persons who play a significant role without personally committing the actus 
reus as principal, if they make their contribution with the shared intent to commit the offence. 
The third approach, the control over the crime theory, does not exclusively side with actus reus 
or mens rea. It focuses on the control made by the participant in the commission of the crime.
189 
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Pursuant to this theory, if they have control over the crime, perpetrators are not only those who 
physically carry out the actus reus of the crime. It also includes those who mastermind its 
commission behind the scene.
190
 Briefly, the control over the crime theory can be taken as a 
compromise of both objective and subjective theories.  
Besides the above three main approaches, it is also necessary to take note of the causal link 
theory proposed by Judge Fulford
191
 and the direct contribution approach observed by Judge 
Wyngaert.
192
    
Of the whole theories, albeit unsettled, the ICC embraced the control over the crime theory.
193 
Particularly, in the Lubanga case, the Court explicitly stated that neither the objective nor the 
subjective approaches could be reconciled with Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute.
194
 The theory 
is also taken as consonant with the differentiation model and then has implication on degree of 
blameworthiness.
195
 However, within the Court, judges like Judge Fulford and Judge Wyngaert 
firmly challenged it. These judges believe that this theory is not supported by the text of the ICC 
Statute. It obliges the judges to depend on artificial speculations as well as have no status of 
customary international law or a general principle and hence cannot rank as a source of law 
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under Article 21 of the Statute.
196
 These challenges against the theory have also the academics 
support like Stewart. For him too, the theory is unwarranted by the ICC Statute and is a 
reflection of an undue domination of the German legal system.
197
 
 
To summarise, currently in ICL, the control over the crime theory is merely an endorsed but not 
a settled approach to distinguishing the modes of responsibility. Moreover, coupled with the 
differentiation model, it has been serving as a double-edged sword by means of making 
distinction and indicating the presences of degree of blameworthiness.    
4.1.3. Establishing the Contemporary outlooks on Degrees of Blameworthiness   
Akin to the above uneasiness on theories of distinguishing the modes of responsibility, there is 
also incongruity concerning the implication behind the modes of responsibility. Put differently, 
in ICL, the raison d’etre behind the listing of Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute is not yet palpable. 
Hitherto, both in the academia and the Court, there are arguments for and against the degree of 
blameworthiness.   
For proponents, the modes of responsibility that are enumerated in Article 25(3) of the ICC 
Statute are not mere listings but are an indication of their degrees of blameworthiness.
198
 As a 
result, while the principals received the greatest punishment, the secondary participants are liable 
for a lesser punishment.
199
 This group further argues that such degrees of blameworthiness even 
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apply amid the secondary participants. Besides Olasolo,
200
 Burghardt
 201
 and Ambos,
202
  this line 
of argument could rightly be represented by Werle who argues for a „value-oriented hierarchy of 
modes of responsibility‟.203 Emblematically, for them, while the modes of responsibility listed in 
Article 25(3)(a) are at the pick of the pyramid, those in Article 25(3)(d) are at the bottom. In the 
middle, from top to down there are those modes which are found in Article 25(3)(b) and Article 
25(3)(c) next to Article 25(3)(a) and above Article 25(3)(d), respectively.     
However, alike the domestic arena, even by the supporters of degrees of blameworthiness, so far, 
there is no blameworthiness discussion on the modes of responsibility which are found within the 
same category/sub-article of the ICC Statute. For example, although in Article 25(3)(a) of the 
ICC Statute there are alternative principal modes of responsibility, till now, no discussion have 
been made to check whether there is degree of blameworthiness among each other. The same is 
also true concerning the secondary modes, which are found within each sub-article of Article 
25(3) of the ICC Statute.   
Moving to the opponents of degree of blameworthiness, they are mainly those who advocate for 
pure unitary model of criminal participation. The challenge has started in the Court itself via 
dissenting and concurring opinions. To them, irrespective of their degree and way of contribution 
to the commission of the crime, there should be no difference among all participants‟ 
responsibility. They should all be considered as perpetrators. Participating by committing cannot 
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by and in itself make other modes of responsibility lesser responsible.
204
 In this sense, almost 
similar to Sliedregt,
205
 Judge Fulford,
206
 and Judge Wyngaert,
207
 Stephens opines that „the self-
evident overlap of several parts of Article 25(3) suggests the absence of intention on the part of 
the drafters to establish such a hierarchy.‟208 Moreover, it is important to mention the bold stand 
held by the ICC Trial Chamber II in the Germain Katanga judgement. In this case, unlike the 
Trial Chamber I‟s view on Thomas Lubanga Diylo case, 209  opined that Article 25(3) of the ICC 
Statute does not inhere a „hierarchy of blameworthiness‟.210 Responsibility is contingent on each 
individual‟s personal blameworthiness, but not on his/her formal role.211   
In general, though there is uneasiness, the ICC opted to interpret Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute 
as if it has a subtle difference in degree of blameworthiness in a descending order from Article 
25(3) (a) to (d). Accordingly, while those found in Article 25(3)(a) received the highest 
punishment; those in Article 25(3)(d) received the lowest punishment. Moreover, the essential 
contribution requirement in a control over the crime theory is inherently regarded as a sign of the 
hierarchy among the modes of responsibility.  
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4.2 Settling the Dust: The Means of Distinguishing the Modes of Responsibility and 
Degrees of Blameworthiness 
The above section has crystallised the on-going debates on modes of responsibility in light of the 
approaches of making distinction among the modes of responsibility and question of degrees of 
blameworthiness. In this section, a specific discussion is made as to which theory is an apt theory 
to distinguishing the modes of responsibility, and ascertaining the query of degrees of 
blameworthiness.   
4.2.1 Discerning the Modes of Responsibility: Unearthing the Apt Theory  
The theory that could be endorsed as a solution for the on-going debate on the means of 
distinguishing the modes of responsibility cannot be chosen arbitrarily. Instead, to absolve it 
from potential criticisms, objective criteria in view of which the evaluation is made should be 
determined. Consequently, the author has identified some criteria. However, first, it is apposite to 
reiterate the ICC‟s approach on model of criminal participation.      
As discoursed before, unlike the pure unitary model, making distinction among the modes of 
responsibility and the existence of contingent liability are the main features of the differentiation 
model. Consonant with these touchstones of the model, the ICC Statute unequivocally provides 
the modes of responsibility in a systematic and organised manner. Moreover, the responsibility 
of the secondary participants is derived from the principals‟ criminal conduct. 212 This 
undoubtedly, unlike the military trials, signifies the adoption of a differentiation model. Albeit 
there is still a call for the adoption of a unitary model,
213
 owing to the particular importance that 
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distinguishing the modes of responsibility has, as discussed under the previous section, the 
author supports and urges this stand of the ICC Statute.    
Receding to the means of differentiation, for deciding the apt theory, the following illustrative 
criterions are considered pertinent by the author.   
First, the theory must be consonant with the purpose of ICL. It must be a theory, which goes 
hand in hand with the purpose why the Court is established: ending impunity and strengthen 
accountability for mass atrocities.
214
 If there is a need to borrow from a domestic arena, the 
transplantation must consider this objective of the Court. Because of the slight difference of the 
objective of the domestic criminal law and ICL, direct adoption of the domestic theory may not 
be appropriate. For instance, the Ethiopian Criminal Code has the objective of „ensuring order, 
peace, and the security of the State, its People, and inhabitants for the public good‟. 215 
Accordingly, unlike ICL that focuses on heinous crimes and offenders who bear the greatest 
responsibility and applied complementary to national jurisdiction
216
 to end impunity, it has no 
such specific focus. Moreover, at their inception, neither the common law nor the civil law legal 
traditions were envisioned to deal with the crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC.
217
 
Therefore, the selection from a domestic legal system should be made in conformity with this 
difference of the objective of the domestic criminal law and ICL. This being said, the theory 
shall not be arbitrarily selected from a single jurisdiction. As explained before, an undue 
dominance of a single country‟s theory is one among the criticisms invoked against the adoption 
of the control over the crime theory. Whereas it is not a flaw to borrow from a single country by 
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and in itself, and international law usually starts from domestic jurisdictions, it is preferable if 
the borrowing from a domestic legal system backed up by sufficient doctrinal development. This 
would place the theory firmly in the ICL paradigm and have an easy legitimacy.  
Compared to the objective and subjective approaches, according to the comparative study of this 
thesis, there is question with regard to the broad base of the control over the crime theory at the 
domestic level. Nonetheless, for the author, the dominance is not as claimed by its opponents like 
Stephens. Stephens says the control over the crime theory is „not only limited to one such 
national legal system [Germany], but in a form almost wholly dependent on one scholar‟s 
[Roxin] view as well as controversial within that one legal system.‟218 Put differently, concerning 
countries outside Germany that apply this theory such as Spanish speaking countries, since they 
were assisted by German Scholars in their criminal law reform,
219
 it is possible still to say there 
is a dominance of one legal system.
220
 However, it is submitted that since the control over the 
crime theory is an eclectic of the subjective and objective approaches‟ 221 attacking it as an undue 
dominance of a single legal system is unconvincing. Its nature by and in itself inherently enables 
it to present wherever the subjective and objective theories have application. Indeed, it has also 
the effect of limiting the ambit of principals only to those who have made the „essential 
contribution‟. 222  Furthermore, having a broad base at a domestic arena is an additional 
advantage, not an absolute criterion to choose a theory. Whatever the domestic base may be, the 
control over the crime theory has a comparative advantage over the objective and subjective 
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approaches in capturing as comprehensively as possible those who may bear greatest 
responsibility and contribute to the realisation of the purpose of the ICL.  
Secondly, compatible with the first criterion, the theory must be consonant with the nature of the 
commission of core crimes. The typical nature of international crimes is based on its collective 
nature. Besides the dirty hand of oligarchical governments, they have the involvement of 
plurality of persons in different capacities and techniques. Thus, the theory must be able to 
address these intricate natures of the commission on crimes under international law. As much as 
possible, it shall be comprehensive enough to embrace those persons who played a significant 
role in the commission of the crimes and bear the greatest responsibility. Truly, 
comprehensiveness shall also be consonant with the fundamental principles of criminal law.   
On this point, in comparison with the objective and subjective theories, the control over the 
crime theory has a particular importance. The objective approach is inept to regulate those 
persons who have made a significant contribution but without committing the actus reus. The 
subjective approach on its part, apart from being unduly broad,
223
 is highly dependent on the 
mens rea of the defendant and even creates a chance for her/him to determine the mode of 
responsibility she/he would be charged with. In this regards, Ohlin firmly questions „Why give 
the actor the power to frame the contours of his own criminality?‟224 Moreover, as argued in the 
Lubanga and in the Katanga cases, since the mens rea requirement enshrined in Article 30 of the 
Statute is applicable to all modes indiscriminately, the subjective theory cannot be reconciled 
with the ICC Statute.
225
 However, the control over the crime theory is relatively free from these 
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setbacks. It can regulate all those who make an essential contribution in the commission of the 
crime and designate them as a principal.    
As the history of international criminal justice has proven, the most dangerous criminals of all 
times do not directly participate in the commission of the crime. As Werle rightly mentions, 
those who are in distance from the scene of the crime are the most dangerous ones.
226
 The most 
serious delinquents like Hitler, Eichmann, and Pinochet did not directly take a single life while 
they are responsible for enormity of international crimes. They were behind the curtain far from 
the scene of the crime. Interestingly, the control over the crime theory covers such offenders and 
fits with the nature of the core crimes as well as plays an important role in narrowing the door of 
impunity than other theories. Further, it is argued that the inclusion of „commission through 
another person‟ under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute is a heavy pointer towards the control 
over the crime theory under the ICC jurisprudence.  
Finally, the theory to be adopted should not be contrary to the due process and other substantive 
rights‟ of the accused. It shall respect the substantive rights of the accused. It should, however, 
be clear that modes of responsibility are not element of the crime but means how offenders 
commit such crimes. Moreover, since clarity and consistency are fundamental to build 
legitimacy, the theory must also play its part in ensuring certainty and predictability in the 
operation of the Court.  
To conclude, while searching a theory that can solve the means of distinguishing the modes of 
responsibility, the question should not be from which legal system in general and from which 
country in particular the theory shall be taken. The question should be on the capability of that 
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theory in circumventing; at least relatively compared to other available theories, the confusion 
and play a role in achieving the purpose of ICL. Moreover, undoubtedly adopting a theory which 
has unanimous or majority‟s support would have a positive impact on the legitimacy of the 
theory and thereby the Court. As a second option, since there is no unanimity, it is also 
preferable to adopt a theory that embraces the main features of the world legal system‟s theories.  
Compared to other theories, the control over the crime theory is a commendable approach to the 
ICC jurisprudence. It has the elements of the objective and subjective theories‟, relatively is 
more consonant with the purpose of ICL and nature of core crimes commission as well as 
compatible with the procedural and substantive rights‟ of the accused. Consequently, the Court is 
right when it adopts the control over the crime theory as an approach to discern the modes of 
responsibility as principal and secondary participant. However, as rightly argued in Germain 
Katanga’s judgement,227 the mere acknowledgment of the control over the crime theory must not 
in and by itself be taken as a warranty for the existence of degrees of blameworthiness among the 
modes of responsibility.  
4.2.2 Degrees of Blameworthiness: The Conundrum of Raison D'etre   
The ambivalence towards degrees of blameworthiness is the result of an absence of a clear rule 
in Article 25 of the ICC Statute. Despite bestowing systematic and organised modes of 
responsibility, the Statute says nothing concerning the implication behind the listed modes of 
responsibility. This silence, as shown in the previous section of this chapter, caused two lines of 
arguments. Of these, albeit still contested, the ICC has opted to endorse the existence of degree 
of blameworthiness in a descending order. Accordingly, whilst the greatest responsibility 
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assumed by those modes that are enshrined under Article 25(3)(a), the lowest responsibility is 
imposed on those which are designated as „residual‟ and found under Article 25(3)(d) of the 
Court‟s Statute. As it is explained below, the author approaches the hierarchy issue from three 
categories:      
4.2.2.1 Degree of Blameworthiness: Principals versus Secondary Participants  
Although there is no clear indication as to the degree of blameworthiness, Article 25(3) of the 
ICC Statute can be read as it creates two main categories of modes of responsibility: those who 
„commit‟ the criminal conduct;228 and, those who participate in the criminal activity of another 
person.
229
 While those who commit the criminal conduct termed principals, those who participate 
in another person‟s (principal‟s) criminal conduct are secondary participants. This classification 
was also supported by the drafting history of the Statute. From the author‟s point of view, this 
categorisation of the modes of responsibility shows the implicit hierarchical relation between 
these groups. This is revealed via the dependence of the secondary participant‟s liability on the 
principals‟ conduct. Moreover, consonant with this, as pinpointed under the previous section of 
this chapter, distinguishing the modes of responsibility has an „expressive justice‟ function. In 
the „expressive justice‟ function context, the distinction of the modes of responsibility as 
principal and secondary and locating the particular role of the participants in the commission of 
the crime has an inherent nature of earmarking blameworthiness. Accordingly, it can be argued 
that it is morally and logically persuasive to make the one who can independently be answerable 
for the criminal conduct more responsible than those who participate in his/her criminal activity 
in different capacity. Put differently, since the denunciatory and educational function of 
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designating the offender, as a principal,
230
 should also be backed up by a commensurate penalty, 
the principals should be more responsible than the secondary participants.  
The sentencing provisions of the ICC Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
Court can support the above reading, which is based on the classification and nature of the 
modes of responsibility. The Statute in its sentencing provision requires the judges consider all 
relevant factors including the severity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person.
231
 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, on its part explicitly require 
emphasis to be given to the culpability of the convicted person and the degree of participation.
232
 
Hence, the modes of responsibility are one of the aspects that the judge is required to consider in 
determining the punishment of a convicted person. Moreover, the documents containing the 
charges are required to include the legal characterisation of the facts to accord the precise mode 
of responsibility under Article 25 and 28 of the Statute.
233
 This requirement to show the precise 
mode of responsibility is an indication that they are among the things that need to be considered 
in determining the punishment. Moreover, putting the principal at the apex of the hierarchy does 
not open a door for those persons who may bear greatest responsibility. Therefore, Ceteris 
paribus all the other conditions, the principals are more dangerous and then blameworthy than 
the secondary participants.   
To sum up, based on the cumulative reading of the above legal provisions and classification as 
well as the nature of principal modes of responsibility, there should be degrees of 
blameworthiness among principal and secondary participants. Those who participate via the 
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modes provided under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute should be more blameworthy than 
those who participate by Article 25(3)(b)(c)(d) capacity. However, this construal of Article 25(3) 
of the Statute should not be too stringent and should guarantee an absolute lower punishment for 
the secondary participants. As Ohlin argues, it should not be a mask to guard the secondary 
participants from receiving the most serious punishments
234
 like life imprisonment.
235
 This 
understanding should be eschewed and the so severe situations where the secondary participants 
may deserve a serious punishment even compared to the principal should be foreseen 
exceptionally. This can be achieved by approaching the degree of blameworthiness interpretation 
between the principal and the secondary participants in a qualified approach, i.e. the hierarchy 
should be a matter of principle.    
Accordingly, the existing proponents of degrees of blameworthiness among the principal and 
secondary participants are right while they argue in support of the existence of hierarchy among 
the principals (Article 25(3)(a)) and the secondary participants (Article 25(3)(b)(c)(d)). However, 
their argument should have considered exceptional circumstances where the secondary 
participants could possibly be so dangerous.  
4.2.2.2 Degrees of Blameworthiness: Between Secondary Participants  
Secondary modes refer to the modes of responsibility that are stipulated under Articles 
25(3)(b)(c)(d) of the ICC Statute. Akin to the principal and secondary modes relation, the ICC 
Statute is silent on the secondary participants‟ degrees of blameworthiness. As explained under 
the previous section of this chapter, albeit there is no agreement, the ICC considers as they are 
listed in descending hierarchical order next to the principals enumerated under Article 25(3)(a) 
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of the Statute. However, owing to the subsequent rationales, the author argues that there is no 
such degree of blameworthiness among secondary modes of responsibility. 
First, the existing argument in favour of degrees of blameworthiness among the secondary 
participants is not supported by the world legal system. As the comparative study conducted in 
this thesis showed, there is no such strict blameworthiness hierarchy, both in civil and common 
law countries. For instance, under the Ethiopian Criminal Code, there is no distinction among the 
secondary participants responsibility.
236
 However, compared to the principal criminal, albeit it is 
not mandatory, there is mitigation of punishment.
237
 Although it is not as apparent as the 
Ethiopian Criminal Code, the examination of the German legal tradition, from which the control 
over the crime theory has been adopted, also indicates the absence of such stringent degree of 
blameworthiness. Precisely, the German Criminal Code does not show a clear hierarchy among 
the secondary participants. For the author, as explained under the comparative chapter of this 
thesis, the silence concerning the abettor cannot necessarily warrant the existence of hierarchy 
between the abettor and the aider. Likewise, under the common law countries, there is no issue 
of degrees of blameworthiness from the outset. All the participants are subjected to the same 
punishment. Moreover, as explained under chapter two of this thesis, the trend during the ad hoc 
tribunals was not consistent. All of these facts signify the absence of practice that ensures an 
absolute hierarchy among secondary modes. True, since practices can also be developed at the 
international level, the absence of such practice alone cannot lead to a conclusion. Nevertheless, 
in conformity with the subsequent rationales, it can be taken as one main ground.    
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Secondly, the existence of an entire degree of blameworthiness argument including the 
secondary participants presumes only a single circumstance. Comparing to each other, the 
participants in a crime could be less, equal, or more dangerous to each other. The seriousness and 
significance of the secondary participants‟ contribution to the criminal conduct of the principals 
differs depending on the prevailing situation in which the contribution is made. Claiming the 
aider is always less significant and dangerous than the instigator does not at all accord with the 
dynamic and intricate natures of the commission of international crimes. There could be a 
situation when the aider is more dangerous than the instigator. The existence of strict degrees of 
blameworthiness interpretation cannot address such possible scenarios. Flexibility, i.e. a case-by-
case determination of responsibility, within the secondary participants will help to address 
unpredictable situations in the commission of the crimes 
Thirdly, the existence of a maximum punishment provision in the Statute
238
 can also be taken as 
an indication for the need of a certain level of discretion on the part of the Court in determining 
punishment. It is submitted, if there had been strict degree of blameworthiness mind, the 
Statute‟s engineers would have provided specific punishments in connection with the respective 
modes of responsibility than simply putting the maximum punishment. Though the absence of 
such detailed punishment by and in itself does not warrant absence of blameworthiness, it can 
equally show that the degree of blameworthiness argument on the modes of responsibility is an 
afterthought of the academia and the judges of the Court. Though afterthoughts in criminal law 
could often possibly be contrary to some principles of the law; like principle of legality,
239
 since 
modes of responsibility are not inherently about defining crimes, afterthought on such area 
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should not be totally rejected. Nevertheless, it should be applied narrowly in a way that is 
consonant with the purpose intended to be achieved by ICL. To this end, the best interpretation 
would be conferring the greatest responsibility to those who commit the criminal conduct 
(principals) and determine the liability of those who participate in the principal‟s conduct by a 
case by case approach. Besides the above grounds, the drafting history of the Statute barely 
supports the existence of degree of blameworthiness throughout Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute. 
There is nothing in the ICC Statute or travaux preparatoire that suggests that the modes of 
responsibility are arranged in a particular order that denote hierarchy.
240
 The intention of the 
drafters was to provide a range of modalities from which judges and other concerned organs can 
choose.
241
 Accordingly, while those who commit the criminal conduct are assigned in one group, 
others who participate in the commission or attempt of the first groups‟ criminal conduct 
constitute the second group. The second groups are modes of responsibility that are relatively, at 
least by being a means to participate in other‟s criminal activity, have a common denominator. 
Hence, the listing in the case of secondary participants in Article 25(3)(b)(c)(d) should not be 
construed as hierarchy but mere enumeration based on their level of closeness and easiness of 
understanding.   
To conclude, the existing proponents of degree of blameworthiness, both in and outside the 
Court, are not convincing when they argue for degrees of blameworthiness even among the 
secondary participants. The responsibility of the secondary participants should be determined on 
a case-by-case basis. This flexibility concerning secondary modes lends a space for the possible 
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offenders who may bear the greatest responsibility while they are under the category of 
secondary participant and is consonant with the purpose of ICL.   
4.2.2.3 Degree of Blameworthiness: Within the Same Sub-articles   
Although the issue of modes of responsibility is the most discussed area in ICL, this discussion 
neglects the issue of degree of blameworthiness among the modes of responsibility, which are 
found within the same sub-article. Concisely, while under the principal‟s provision242 there are 
direct perpetrator; co-perpetrator; indirect perpetrator and indirect co-perpetrator, order; solicits 
and induces are provided in Article 25(3)(b) of the ICC Statute. There are also other categories 
of participation under Article 25(3)(c) of the Statute. Hence what is missed from being discussed 
is, for example, the degree of blameworthiness relationship between principals like among the 
direct perpetrator, co-perpetrator, and commission through another person. The same question is 
also true for the other sub-article of the Statute in particular, Article 25(3)(b) which contains 
those who order; solicits and induces another person, and Article 25(3)(c) that includes aiding 
and abetting.  
On this point, the author argues for a plain reading of the provisions and determines 
responsibility on a case-by-case approach. This point can be inferred, besides the above 
justifications accorded for the secondary modes relation in general, from the general structure of 
Article 25(3) of the Statute and the practice of the Court.  
The structure of Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute does not accord an exhaustive list of all modes 
of responsibility. For example, Article 25(3)(c) of the Statute provides that as far as it is with the 
purpose of facilitating the commission of a criminal conduct by the principal, besides aiding and 
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abetting, it includes all other assistances. This provision is an open-ended provision that can 
include future ways of participating in the commission of a crime via a generic term of 
assistance. In the same vein, Article 25(3)(d) of the Statute adopted the same open and broad 
approach. Even in the other provisions, as the practice of the Court showed, there is still a 
probability to come up with additional modes of responsibility, which is not explicitly provided 
by the Statute. Albeit it is still arguable mode, this practice was manifested upon the 
development of the indirect co-perpetration as a principal mode of responsibility. In the presence 
of this illustrative nature of the modes of responsibility that are found in the same sub-article of 
Article 25(3) of the Statute, it is not plausible to adopt a degree of blameworthiness. Instead, it 
should be evaluated based on a case-by-case approach.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
5.1 Conclusion  
The typical nature of crimes under international law is the involvement of many persons in 
different capacities. This „multi-person criminality‟ nature coupled with the very nature of the 
core crimes makes the establishment of individual criminal responsibility very difficult. In 
principle, individual criminal responsibility has been recognised since the Nuremburg trials. 
However, compared to the military trials and ad hoc tribunals, the most detailed provision on 
modes of responsibility is accorded by the ICC Statute, in particular Article 25. Article 25(3) of 
the Statute lists the modes of responsibility under four sub-articles. While Article 25(3)(a) 
provides the principal modes of responsibility, Articles 25(3)(b)(c)(d) enshrines the secondary 
participants. The provision is silent concerning the implication behind the listing of the modes, 
and how to distinguishing them among each other. Owing to this silence, the modes of 
responsibility, specifically, the theories of making distinction, and the existence or otherwise of 
degrees of blameworthiness have been disputatious areas both in the ICC and in academia. 
Hence, these two issues are the main concern of this thesis.   
The tensions on the above issues of modes of responsibility can generally be categorised into two 
groups. The first group is those who support the control over the crime theory as a means to 
make a distinction and argue for the existence of a degree of blameworthiness in a descending 
order among the modes of responsibility. The second group is those who reject both the theory 
and the existence of degree of blameworthiness, and argue mainly for the plain reading of the 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
Statute‟s provision. In both groups, the relation of the modes of responsibility, which are found 
in the same group (sub-article), has never been an issue.  
This thesis is conducted with the aim of ameliorating this tension. Besides a comparative study, a 
detail discussion is made on the issues with a specific emphasis on the ICC legal framework and 
the academia‟s debate. Consequently, besides the incidental issues, the author comes up with the 
following points as a conclusion. 
Albeit there is a contrary argument for a pure unitary model of criminal participation, 
distinguishing the modes of responsibility can be justified in light of, inter alia, Criminal law 
principles, human rights aspect, transitional justice aspect, and the purpose of ICL. This is 
consonant with both the civil law (Ethiopia and Germany) and common law (the UK and USA) 
legal systems that the author examined. While in the common law countries there is a formal 
distinction among the principal and secondary participants, under the civil law countries there is 
an actual distinction wherein the liability of the secondary participants is contingent on the 
principal. However, in both legal systems (in view of the above selected countries), there is no 
express and unanimously agreed theory of making distinction among the modes of responsibility. 
However, an eclectic of objective and subjective approaches, and the control over the crime 
theory are the foremost approaches under the civil law countries Ethiopia and Germany, 
respectively. The common law countries, on their part, tend to focus on the subjective approach. 
Besides at least the formal distinction of the principal and the secondary participants, the 
dependence of the secondary participants‟ responsibility on the principal signposts the 
worldwide move to a differentiation model and the fading of the unitary model of criminal 
participation. However, the mere move and recognition of the differentiation model of criminal 
participation does/should not guarantee the existence of degree of blameworthiness. Degree of 
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blameworthiness, as explained above, could only be one among the possible justifications for 
making distinction but narrowly. To put it in the context of the comparative study, while there is 
no degree of blameworthiness relation whatsoever in the case of common law countries (the UK 
and USA), there is no absolute degree of blameworthiness in civil law countries: Ethiopia and 
Germany. Put differently, while in Germany there is no mitigation of punishment provided for 
the abettor, in Ethiopia, the mitigation provided for the secondary participants is not mandatory. 
Hence, though there is a differentiation model, the abettor in Germany and the secondary 
participants in Ethiopia could receive the same punishment as the principal.   
 On the model of criminal participation, the ICC Statute is self-telling. It does recognise a 
differentiation model of criminal participation. However, akin to the above domestic 
jurisdictions, it is silent on how to differentiate the modes of responsibility. Hence, there is a 
need to opt the apt theory. The author believes, for any theory to be opted as a best approach for 
distinguishing the modes of responsibility under the ICC jurisprudence, it should be consonant 
with the purpose of ICL, the nature of core crimes, the text of the Statute, and the substantive and 
procedural rights of the parties to the proceeding. Moreover, it should be a theory that can play 
its part in boosting the Court‟s legitimacy.   
The author, in this thesis, has concluded that compared to the available theories; the control over 
the crime theory is the apt theory. Besides being consonant with the above criteria, it is a better 
approach to strike the balance as it has the nature of both the objective and subjective 
approaches. In addition, the country where it is taken shall not be an Achilles heel for its 
endorsement under the ICC jurisprudence.    
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Moving to the degree of blameworthiness question, the author does not fully endorse the 
arguments made by both the proponents and opponents. For him, it is unconvincing to say that 
Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute recognised a descending order of degree of blameworthiness 
from Article 25(3)(a) to 25(3)(d) wherein those who are found under Article 25(3)(a) receive the 
highest penalty whilst those who fall under Article 25(3)(d) receive the lowest punishment. 
Similarly, he does not concur a plain reading of the entire Article 25(3) of the Statute. Article 
25(3) of the ICC Statute does not warrant an absolute degree of blameworthiness as the current 
proponents argue, and does not totally give a deaf ear as the opponents argue. A „One-size-fits-
all‟ construal of Article 25(3) of the Statute is unpersuasive and does not comport with the reality 
on the ground.  
To the author‟s mind, the provision‟s construal should be seen, inter alia, in view of the very 
purpose of ICL; drafting history and structure of Article 25(3) of the Statute; the nature of the 
core crimes; and, the dynamic nature of the commission of international crimes. Evaluating the 
issue in light of these illustrative standards will help to ameliorate the existing tension. 
Accordingly, the author has made his conclusion from three perspectives. These are: 
a. As a matter of principle, ceteris paribus, there should be degree of blameworthiness only 
among principals and secondary participants; i.e., among those provided in Article 25(3)(a) on 
the one hand and Article 25(3)(b)(c)(d) on the other hand.  
b. There is no degree of blameworthiness among the secondary participants, which are provided 
in Article 25(3)(b)(c)(d) of the Statute. Their responsibility should be determined on a case-by-
case approach.  
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c. There is no degree of blameworthiness among the modes of responsibility that are provided 
under the same sub article; i.e., either as a principal
243
 or secondary participant.
244
 Their 
responsibility should be determined on a case-by-case approach.  
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 Art. 25(3)(a), the ICC Statute.  
244
 Art. 25(3)(b),(c) & (d), the ICC Statute.   
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5.2 Recommendation 
The ICC is not an infant anymore. It has been functioning for more than ten years. However, the 
controversial issues on some of its very pivotal provisions like the modes of responsibility are 
not perfect. It is evident from the practices of the Court and writings of the academia that the 
tension on the above issues is not yet settled. The author duly believes in the need of making 
further study; but it should be to narrowing the existing gap. This paper is conducted with the 
aim of playing this role, specifically, on the means of distinguishing the modes of responsibility 
and the question of degree of blameworthiness. Therefore, based on the above conclusion, the 
author recommends the following points:   
I. With regards to approaches of making distinction  
 The control over the crime theory shall be continued as an official approach of making 
distinction among the principal and secondary modes of responsibility. 
II. With regards to degrees of blameworthiness   
 Degree of blameworthiness among the modes of responsibility shall be construed 
narrowly and shall be limited only between principals and the secondary participants‟ 
relation.   
 There should be no degree of blameworthiness both among the secondary participants 
and the modes of responsibility that are found in the same sub-article either as principal 
or secondary participants. Responsibility in both cases must be determined on a case-by-
case approach.     
Word Count: 19 368 words.  
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